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INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS: A COMMON MEASURE
OF DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
In awarding damages for tortious interference with contrac-
tual relations' and for inducing the breach of contract, the courts
apply three different theories:2 (1) that the damages recoverable
for the tort action are the same as the damages recoverable for a
breach of contract;' (2) that recovery may be had for damages
that are the proximate result of the wrongful act as in negligence
tort cases; 4 (3) that the measure of damages is the same as that
in intentional tort actions and includes recovery for mental anguish
and punitive damages." Some courts even apply a combination of
these measures in a single case.6 The disagreement concerning the
correct measure of damages applicable in cases of interference
with contractual relations has resulted in uncertainty in the law.
The answers to the questions concerning the extent of the inter-
feror's liability for consequential damages, recovery for mental
suffering, and awarding of punitive damages are dependent upon
which measure the court applies.
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the three different
measures to determine whether there should be a common measure
of damages in such actions. Only situations in which liability for
injury has been found will be considered and no attempt is made
1 Interference with contractual relations and inducing breach of contract are
separate and distinct actions. Interference is broader; it compensates for damages
resulting from the defendant's actions affecting the subject matter of the contract,
and does not require proof that there has been a breach of contract. Note, Interfer-
ence With Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1406'
(1966).
2 Interference With Contractual Relations in New England, 38 B.U.L. REv. 285,
295 (1958); Note, Damages Recoverable in an Action for Inducing Breach of Con-
tract, 30 COLUMr. L. REv. 232 (1930).
3 See, e.g., Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957);
Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, 181 F. Supp. 809 (N-D.
Iowa 1960).
4 See, e.g., Anderson v. Moscowitz, 260 Mass. 523, 157 N.E. 601 (1927);
Hooker, Corser & Mitchell Co. v. Hooker, 89 Vt. 383, 95 Atl. 649 (1915).
5 See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962); Duff v. Engel-
berg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 505, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965), establishing that California
definitely applies the intentional tort measure of damages, and that actions against
the breaching party and the interferor are cumulative rather than alternative.
6 E.g., McNutt Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966 (1955),
allowed punitive damages while limiting compensatory damages to the contract rule.
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to deal with the separate problem of under what conditions liability
should be imposed.7
CONTRACT MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The goal in awarding compensation to a party injured by
breach of contract is to place the injured plaintiff in the position
he would have been in if the contract had been performed.8 In
contract cases various expressions of this goal have been employed
as rules limiting recovery of damages. One common expression of
such a rule is that damages are recoverable if they are the proxi-
mate result of the breach, and requires that the rules of "proxi-
mate causation" be satisfied.' The form of this rule is also applied
in tort actions,'" in which the object is to compensate an injured
plaintiff so as to place him in as good a position as he would have
been if the wrong had not been committed." When the measure of
damages is stated in terms of proximate cause in a case involving
interference with contractual relations it is impossible to determine
whether the court is applying a contract rule or a tort measure,
however, the amount of recovery will likely be the same.'
In a suit between the parties to a contract for a breach of that
contract, the leading case sets forth the rule that "damages are re-
coverable only for those injuries that the defendant had reason to
foresee as a probable result of his breach when the contract was
made."' This is not identical to the rule stated as applicable in
tort, since the tortfeasor is often required to pay for injurious re-
sults he had no reason to foresee at all. 4 Therefore, in an action
for interference with contractual relations the amount recoverable
will generally be greater if the tort rule is applied.
Frequently the courts do. not discuss the theory upon which
T See generally, PROSSER, TORTS § 123 (3d ed. 1964); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1272
(1952); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933); Carpenter, Interference With Contractual
Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1928); Harper, Interference With Contractual
Relations, 47 Nw. UL. REv. 873 (1953); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36
HARV. L. REV. 663 (1923); Developments in the Law of Competitive Torts, 77 HARv.
L. REV. 888 (1964); Note, Interference With Contractual Relations: A Property
Limitation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1406 (1966).
S 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 at 31 (1964); McCoRaacx, DAMAGES § 137 at
561 (1935).
9 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 997 at 19 (1964), criticizing the use of the word "prox-
imate" as inadequate for stating rules of recovery.
10 Ibid.
11 McCoRMicx, DAMAGES § 137 at 560 (1935).
12 This is particularly true in suits by a real estate broker for a lost commission.
E.g., Johnston v. Gustafson, 201 Minn. 629, 277 N.W. 252 (1938).
18 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
14 5 CORmIN, CONTRACTS § 1019 (1964).
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they base the award. Although the theory is identified as contract,
the court generally applies the rule that compensation may be had
for injuries that are the natural and proximate result of the wrong-
ful act.15 In Swaney v. Crawley6 in which the defendent induced
the owner of real property to breach an executory contract of sale
with the plaintiff, the court, after stating that the general rule of
damages was applicable in tort and contract alike, said "the ruling
seems sound in principle that the injured party is limited as a gen-
eral rule, to such damages as might have been recovered for a
breach of the contract itself.117 The court did not preclude the
possibility of recovering exemplary damages in a case where ex-
press malice was shown, 18 suggesting that certain distinctly tort
damages may be applied while limiting consequential damages to
the benefits of the particular contract. There is little difference
between the results reached in Swaney and the results that would
be reached in a typical negligence action, with the exception of
possible recovery for mental anguish.
Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America"9
expressly applied the contract rule of damages limiting recovery
to injuries reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation
of the parties at the time the contract was made to an action
against a third party for inducing the breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. In that case union officials influenced plaintiff's
employees to refuse to work more than eight hours in any one day,
and further directed strikes against the plaintiff corporation. The
court stated that "while the Iowa Supreme Court has not ruled
expressly on the measure of damages for inducement of breach of
contract, it would appear likely that it would follow the contract
measure of damages." 2 Courts limiting recovery for interference
with contractual relations to recovery for breach of contract as
stated in Wilson may feel that to allow the plaintiff recovery for
unforeseeable results is a windfall and places the plaintiff in a
better position than he would have been in if he sued for breach
of contract. This reasoning is not sound. There is no reason why
a wrongdoer should be given the benefit of contract damages at
the injured plaintiff's expense.
Punitive damages are generally not recoverable in actions for
15 Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (1957); Johnston v. Gustaf-
son, 201 Minn. 629, 277 N.W. 252 (1938).
16 133 Minn. 57, 157 N.W. 910 (1916).
17 Id. at - 157 N.W. at 911.
18 Id. at -, 157 N.W. at 912.
19 181 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
20 Id. at 822.
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breach of contract,2 ' however, most courts award punitive damages
in actions for interference with contractual relations2 2 including
courts applying the contract rule of damages.28 In McNutt Oil &
Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli,24 a petroleum corporation induced the
seller of a gas station to breach a clause restricting competition
with the purchaser. Discussing the measure of damages the court
said that actual damages were to be ascertained by the same stan-
dards as if the action were upon the contract instead of tort, but if
the acts of the defendant were "wrongful, wilful and malicious in
fact," punitive damages might be awarded. The weight of author-
ity is clearly in favor of awarding punitive damages in actions for
interference with contractual relations regardless of the measure
of consequential damages applied.
Since most contracts before the court are commercial and the
pecuniary interest dominant, recovery for mental distress resulting
from a breach is generally denied.25 When mental suffering is
caused intentionally and accompanied by wilful torts such as defa-
mation there may be recovery. 26 Recovery for mental anguish in
interference with contractual relations cases is limited to these sit-
uations: intentional interference accompanied by elements of wilful
torts.27 Whether the measure of damages applied is contract or
tort would have little effect on the issue of recovery for mental
anguish providing the jurisdiction allows such recovery in contract
actions involving elements of wilful torts.
The significance of applying the contract measure of damages
in interference cases is not whether punitive damages or recovery
for mental anguish is allowed, but that the amount recoverable as
consequential damages may be affected. Whether the measure of
consequential damages is the same in contract as in tort in a given
case depends in part upon the contract rule applied (proximate
cause or foreseeability at the time of contracting), and in part,
upon how liberally "foreseeability" is construed.
TORT MEASURES OF DAMAGE
Most courts have applied a tort measure of damages (either
analogous to negligent torts or intentional torts) to interference
21 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 at 438 (1964).
22 Note, Damages Recoverable in an Action For Inducing Breach of Contract,
30 CoLurm. L. REv. 232, 237 (1930).
28 E.g., McNutt Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966 (1955).
24 Ibid.
25 McCoRmICK, DAMAGES § 145 at 592-93 (1935).
26 5 CoRBNn, CONTRACTs § 1076 at 427 (1964).
27 Compare Gould v. Kramer, 253 Mass. 433, 149 N.E. 142 (1925), with Steiner
v. Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942).
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with contractual relations actions.2 Recovery against the interferor
is allowed even if the plaintiff has proceeded against the party de-
faulting on the contract 29 and has received partial satisfaction."0
When the court applies the negligent tort theory the rule is ex-
pressed in terms of direct and proximate results of the wrongful
act, and recovery includes such loss of profits as the plaintiff can
prove resulted from the interferor's acts."' There is little difference
between the application of this rule in tort or in contract. There is,
however, a difference between the application of the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale3 2 and the application of foreseeability in negligence
actions. In negligent tort cases foreseeability is generally based
at the time of the wrongful act, not at the time of the agreement. 3
It has been suggested that application of the negligent tort theory
would seem to have validity where the acts of interference are not
malevolent in nature, and employ truthful but unjustified persua-
sion. 4 This view seems to overlook the tendency of the courts to
deny recovery for negligent interference with contractual relations,
and that the action requires intent and lack of justification. 3
A majority of courts treat the tort of interference with con-
tractual relations as an intentional one and consequently allow
greater recovery. 6 One state has even enacted a statute which pro-
vides for the recovery of treble damages for inducing or procuring
the breach of a contract. 7 In Wade v. Culp,5 a competitor induced
Wade to breach his contract with the plaintiff, under which Wade
was to develop an electric steak broiler to be marketed by the
plaintiff, Culp. The court recognized that the measure of damages
applied in such action was not uniform in all jurisdictions, that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover for losses sustained as a direct
and proximate result of the wrongful act, and stated that, "the cor-
rect rule is to hold the tortfeasor responsible for all of the conse-
28 PROSSER, TORTS § 123 at 973 (3d ed. 1964).
29 E.g., Swift v. Beatty, 39 Tenn. App. 292, 282 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1954).
30 Duff v. Engelberg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 505, 47 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1965), plaintiff
recovered both specific performance and incidental damages from the party breach-
ing the contract and intentional tort damages from the interferor.
31 Cases cited supra note 4.
32 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
33 Developments in the Law of Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 96
(1964).
34 Id. at 967-68.
35 PROSSER, TORTS § 123 at 973 (3d ed. 1964).
36 Ibid. See the cases cited supra note 5.
37 TENN. CODE ANN. ch. 15, § 47-15-113 (1964), which was construed to apply
to contracts in existence, contracts implied in fact, but not contracts implied at law
or quasi-contracts in Mefford v. City of Dupontonia, 49 Tenn. App. 349, 354 S.W.2d
823 (Ct. App. 1962).
38 107 Ind. App. 503, 23 N.E.2d 615 (1939).
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quences growing out of his wrongful act."3 The court further sug-
gested that exemplary damages might have been awarded.
Not all courts applying the intentional tort measure of dam-
ages allow recovery for all unforeseen consequences resulting from
the act of interference. In Lundgren v. Freemont,4° the court stated
that the plaintiff might recover such damages that proved to be the
result of wilful and intentional misconduct, however, recovery for
injury to reputation and loss of credit was limited to situations in
whch such injuries were reasonably foreseeable under the circum-
stances. In that case a general contractor sued architects for inter-
fering with the plaintiff's contract with a high school district for
the construction of certain school facilities. When the contractor
notified the architects that the buildings were ready for final in-
spection and acceptance, the school district notified the plaintiff
that they were terminating the contract for total breach on the ad-
vice of the architects. Limiting recovery to injuries "reasonably
foreseeable under the circumstances" within the framework of in-
tentional torts has the advantage of controlling excessive recovery
for remote consequences, while permitting assessment for exem-
plary damages and compensation for mental distress in proper
cases.
Wrongful motive alone may support liability in interference
cases, 41 and where the acts of the interferor may be described as
"malicious" or "wanton" courts unanimously award exemplary
damages. 2 Punitive damages are generally considered peculiar to
intentional torts, and to award punitive damages on theories anal-
ogous to either contract or negligent tort is inconsistent. There ap-
pears to be some question as to the degree of malice required to
support an award for exemplary damages. The court in Worie v.
Boze48 defined legal malice as being unjustified intentional inter-
ference with a contract the defendant knows exists. The facts of
the case revealed a conspiracy to breach a contract containing a
clause restricting competition.
Other courts require "malice in fact" before awarding punitive
damages . 4 Not every instance of interference demands the award
39 Id. at -, 23 N.E.2d at 619-20.
40 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
41 PROSSER, TORTS § 123 at 951 (3d ed. 1964); but cf. Sparks v. McCrary, 156
Ala. 382, 47 So. 332 (1908).
42 Note, Damages Recoverable in an Action for Inducing Breach of Contract,
30 COLUM. L. REv. 232, 237 (1930).
43 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956).
44 McNutt Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966, 971 (1955);
BLAcK, LAW DICTIoNARY (4th ed. 1951), defines malice in fact as: "actual or express
malice. It implies a desire or intent to injure, while malice in law or implied malice
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of exemplary damages. When there is unjustified intentional inter-
ference, but the methods of interference employ truthful persuasion,
punitive damages should not be granted but should be limited to
cases involving more predatory methods of interference such as
defamation, fraud, and conspiracy. 5
Like punitive damages, recovery for mental distress resulting
from the defendant's wrongful act is generally a tort measure of
damages."' When an established business is wrongfully interfered
with and injured, courts have not allowed recovery for personal dis-
comfort and annoyance; 4 7 however, when the acts of interference
involve elements of defamation there may be recovery for mental
distress.48
CONCLUSION
While breach of contract actions preserve the plaintiff's inter-
est in securing the performance of the contract in accordance with
the agreed terms, actions for interference with contractual relations
preserve that interest from unjustified interference by third persons
not parties to the contract. Both parties should contemplate the
possibility of a breach of the contract when they enter into the
agreement, and generally an adequate remedy for a breach is readily
available by an action in contract for damages. However, unjustified
interference with that contract by one not a party is not contem-
plated when the original agreement is made. Such interference may
occur and the remedy sounds in tort, not contract.
Courts often confuse the rule of damages applicable in inter-
ference with contractual relations cases. Although the interference
action protects contract rights, it does not necessarily follow that
the injuries resulting from a breach by one of the contracting
parties will be the same as injuries resulting from the interference
by a third person. In many instances the damages may be the same,
but to limit recovery in all interference cases to those injuries rea-
sonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of contracting is to
confuse a basic difference between tort and contract damages, for
in tort foreseeability is considered from the time of the wrongful
act, not from the time of contracting. Furthermore, interference
does not require that the contract be breached. An unjust result is
means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse, and the jury may
infer it as a deduction from want of probable cause."
45 Developments in the Law oj Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 967-68
(1964).
46 MCCORMICK, DAmAeGs § 145 at 592 (1935).
47 Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942).
48 Gould v. Kramer, 253 Mass. 433, 149 N.E. 142 (1925).
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often reached in jurisdictions applying the Hadley v. Baxendale rule
of damages for breach of contract to interference cases because the
interferor is afforded the benefit of contract damages regardless of
the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. In effect, the court is making
the interferor a party to the contract for the purpose of determining
damages.
The tort action has largely been confined to intentional acts
of interference; at the present time the courts do not generally
allow recovery for negligent interference with contractual relations.
Intent and lack of justification are required to support the action,
and to apply either a contract measure of damages or a measure
analogous to negligent tort actions is inconsistent with this view.
Similarly punitive damages and recovery for mental anguish are
generally peculiar to intentional torts, and to award such damages
in an interference action while applying a contract measure of
damages is somewhat inconsistent.
It is submitted that the proper measure of damages is the in-
tentional tort rule, but that recovery for mental anguish and the
award of exemplary damages should be limited to cases in which
more predatory methods are employed. Such a rule is consistent
with the tendency of the courts to treat the action as an intentional
tort, and permits the plaintiff to recover to the full extent of his
injuries, but is flexible enough to avoid excessive recovery when
the methods of interference involve unjustified but truthful per-
suasion.
David L. Fairbanks
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